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PREVIEW; Draggin’ Y Cattle Company, Inc. v. Junkermier, 
Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.: Abandonment as Breach 
 
Joshua Thornton 
 
 
 The Montana Supreme Court oral argument is scheduled for 
Wednesday, November 14, 2018, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of 
the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, 
Helena, Montana. Gary M. Zadick is expected to argue on behalf of 
the Appellant, New York Marine and General Insurance Company 
(NYM). Timothy B. Strauch and David R. Paoli are expected to 
argue on behalf of the Appellees, Draggin’ Y Cattle Company, Inc., 
Roger and Carrier Peters, and Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, 
Stevens, P.C. (JCCS).  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This case presents the Court with the question of whether a 
settlement agreement is unenforceable because it is unreasonable 
pursuant to Montana law. Within this broad question, the Court must 
determine whether the district court correctly found NYM had 
“abandoned” JCCS as well as whether the district court applied the 
proper reasonableness standard. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 In 2004 Larry Addink, a certified public accountant 
employed by JCCS, advised the Peters on a structure sale of a 
conservation easement.1 Following the sale, Addink learned that he 
had structured the exchange incorrectly, which exposed the Peters 
to unanticipated tax liability, and he promptly notified JCCS and its 
insurer, NYM.2 JCCS held a $2 million professional liability 
insurance policy from NYM that required NYM to defend JCCS, 
ensure defense cooperation between JCCS and NYM, and relieved 
NYM of indemnifying without prior written approval.3 
 
 In 2011, the Peters filed the underlying claim now in 
dispute.4 NYM filed a reservation of rights stating, in pertinent part, 
                                                 
1 Appellees’ Answer Brief at 11, Draggin’ Y Cattle Company, Inc. v. 
Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., https://perma.cc/7Z52-2SWV 
(Mont. June 7, 2017) (No. DA 17-0731).  
2 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Draggin’ Y Cattle Company, Inc. v. 
Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., https://perma.cc/QBY3-CVEX 
(Mont. Apr. 17, 2017) (No. DA 17-0731).  
3 Id. at 2. 
4 Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 17. 
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that “nothing herein or heretofore should be construed as an 
admission of coverage for liability.”5 NYM determined that the 
Peters could recover approximately $250,000 in interest on tax 
liability from the structured sale.6 However, NYM did not file a 
declaratory judgment to clarify the scope of coverage owed to its 
insured.7 
 
 In 2014, the Peters offered JCCS a settlement agreement for 
the $2 million policy limit.8 NYM declined this offer and countered 
with $100,000, stating that JCCS would be in breach of contract if 
it settled directly with the Peters without any involvement from 
NYM.9 JCCS wished to settle within policy limits to be protected 
from any excess verdict, but NYM refused to accept any offer NYM 
deemed to be “unreasonable.”10  
 
 On November 12, 2014,11 all of the parties participated in an 
unsuccessful mediation.12 Hours later, the Peters and JCCS 
negotiated a settlement agreement, conditioned upon a court 
reasonableness hearing, of  $10 million directly executed against 
NYM.13 The following day, the Peters and JCCS executed the 
settlement agreement consisting of a $10 million judgment, a 
covenant not to execute the judgment against JCCS, and the 
conditions that all rights and claims against NYM be assigned to the 
Peters, and that Addink would be dismissed from the lawsuit.14 
 
 On December 11, 2017, in state district court, Judge Eddy 
held that the $10 million settlement agreement was reasonable and 
entered judgment against the insureds.15 In relation to the legal 
framework, Judge Eddy ordered, “[o]f course, in this case [NYM] 
was defending under a reservation of rights, which makes it 
distinguishable from the facts of Tidyman’s, and [the reasonableness 
of the stipulated judgment] will be analyzed accordingly by the 
Court consistent with the framework of [Freyer] and related 
cases.”16 
                                                 
5 Id. at 18. 
6 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 3. 
7 Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 19. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 21. 
10 Id. at 20. 
11 Two days prior to scheduled hearing of NYM’s five summary 
judgment motions. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 3. 
12 Id. at 24. 
13 Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 25. 
14 Id. at 26. 
15 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 7. 
16 Id (citing Dkt. 366). This quotation is not included in Appellees’ Answer 
Brief, supra note 1, at 28. 
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 On appeal, NYM raises the following issues: 1) did the 
district court correctly determine NYM abandoned JCCS; and 2) did 
the district court correctly conclude the same reasonableness 
standards apply regardless of the mechanism of abandonment?17 
 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellant’s Argument 
 
 Appellant argues that the district court used the incorrect 
reasonableness standard under Tidyman’s Management Services, 
Inc. v. Davis,18 and Tidyman’s Management Services Inc. v. 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA,19 in holding that 
NYM breached its duty to defend by abandonment despite finding 
that “this is not a breach of the duty to defend case.”20 Appellant 
contends that the district court erred by equating abandonment with 
a breach of the duty to defend when an insurer does not waive its 
rights and limits under the policy21 and fails to file an improper 
declaratory action.22 Appellant argues that it did not abandon, but 
rather continuously defended, JCCS throughout the litigation by 
filing a reservation of rights, providing defense counsel, and 
tendering reasonable defense costs.23 Appellant contends ultimately 
that, since NYM provided a defense, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. 
v. Freyer,24 should have been the controlling legal framework in 
evaluating the reasonableness of the settlement.25 
 
B. Appellees’ Argument 
 
 Appellee argues that the district court used the correct 
reasonableness standard under Tidyman, holding that NYM’s 
“abandonment of its insured is just as certain as if it ha[d] breached 
the duty to defend.”26 Accordingly, there was “no reason to deviate 
from the analysis developed to consider the reasonableness of 
settlement agreements” if NYM had actually breached its duty to 
defend.27 Appellee contends that NYM abandoned JCCS by offering 
                                                 
17 Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 8. 
18 330 P.3d 1139 (Mont. 2014) (Tidyman I). 
19 378 P.3d 1182 (Mont. 2016) (Tidyman II) (hereinafter both Tidyman 
I and Tidyman II are referred to collectively as “Tidyman” within the text). 
20 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
21 Id. at 10. 
22 Id. at 12. 
23 Id. at 10–11. 
24 312 P.3d 403 (Mont. 2013). 
25 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
26 Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 39. 
27 Id. 
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unreasonable insurance protection because they: (1) refused to admit 
coverage; (2) failed to timely file a declaratory action; and (3) 
unreasonably refused JCCS’ requests to either settle within or waive 
policy limits,28 which falls outside of established Montana rules and 
policy.29 Appellee contends that as a result, JCCS had no other 
option but to settle or face liability for any excess judgment.30 As 
such, Appellees argue that the Tidyman framework was correctly 
applied in Judge Eddy’s ultimate finding that the stipulated 
settlement was reasonable and thus enforceable.31 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
 Tidyman was the correct legal framework for deciding the 
reasonableness of the settlement agreement because JCCS 
reasonably settled after being abandoned by NYM. The following 
analysis indentifies the legal frameworks of Tidyman and Freyer, 
addressing that, while the present factual dispute falls between both 
decisions, it ultimately lands far closer to Tidyman. Accordingly, the 
Tidyman framework for reasonableness should be applied. 
 
 Settlement agreements are required to be reasonable.32 
Although a reasonableness hearing for a settlement agreement is not 
procedurally required under Montana law, when an insurer has 
breached its duty to defend a hearing is allowed upon the insurer’s 
request.33 The Court is not required to evaluate a settlement 
agreement as collusive when the insurer breaches its duty to 
defend.34 A reasonableness hearing is required when an insurer 
overcomes the presumption that the settlement agreement was 
reasonable.35 In Tidyman I, the Court found the insurers’ actions 
were an unjustifiable breach of its duty to defend.36 In assessing the 
reasonableness of a settlement agreement after the insurer has 
breached its duty to defend, Tidyman considers the objective merits 
underlying the case and any value a reasonable uninsured insured 
person would gain in exchanging a confessing judgment for a 
covenant not to execute.37 
 
                                                 
28 Id. at 30. 
29 Id. at 32. 
30 Id. at 38–39. 
31 Id. at 45. 
32 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–302 (2017). 
33 Tidyman’s I, 330 P.3d 1139, 1152–1153. 
34 Id. at 1156 (Citing Nielsen v. TIG Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
49002 at 32–33 (2006)). 
35 Id. at 1154. 
36 Id. at 1152. 
37 Tidyman’s II, 378 P.3d 1182, 1186. 
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 Next, when an insurer abandons its insured, the insured is 
justified in taking steps to limit their personal liability.38 When there 
is an issue surrounding coverage, insurance companies are not 
required, but are “repeatedly admonished” to defend the insured and 
file a declaratory action to establish coverage.39 Once a declaratory 
action is filed, a pretrial settlement agreement cannot represent 
consequential damages contemplated by the insurance parties at the 
time of contract, unless the insurer breaches its duty to defend.40 In 
Freyer, the Court held that the insurer properly defended the insured 
but breached its duty to indemnify, which was determined by 
general contract principles, resulting in a finding that a settlement 
agreement is unreasonable for any excess over the policy limit.41 
 
 This case falls between both Tidyman, where a settlement 
agreement could be found to be unreasonable if the insurer, who 
breached its duty to defend, overcame the presumption in favor of 
the insured that the settlement agreement is reasonable, and Freyer, 
where excess settlement agreement was found unreasonable for an 
insurer that defended the insured, filed a declaratory action, but 
breached its duty to indemnify. 
 
 Here, NYM cannot overcome the presumption in favor of 
JCCS’s reasonable settlement with the Peters. Even though NYM’s 
duty to defend is not at issue, the district court equated its conduct 
(i.e., abandonment) as a constructive breach of the duty to defend, 
making Tidyman as the correct legal framework.42 While it is not an 
actual breach of the duty to defend, Tidyman, as a controlling 
framework, is far more relevant as opposed to Freyer, where general 
contract principles were used to determine whether the insurer had 
breached its duty to indemnify the insured. As NYM pointed out, 
“this is not a breach of the duty to defend case,”43 so basic contract 
principles of Freyer are not required in this decision. It is true that 
NYM provided defense by providing defense counsel, paying 
reasonable defense costs, and filing a reservation of rights.44 
                                                 
38 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Freyer, 312 P.3d 403, 413 (Mont. 
2013) (Citing Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Ross, 180 P.3d 427, 433 (Colo. 2008)). 
39 Id. at 415.  
40 Id. at 414–15 (Citing Mont. Petroleum Tank Release Comp. Bd. V. 
Crumleys, 174 P.3d 948, 960 (Mont. 2008). 
41 Id. at 415–16.  
42 This is logically consistent even if Judge Eddy directly ordered Freyer to be 
the controlling legal framework, as Appellant contends was the case. See 
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 7. 
43 Id. at 9. 
44 Greg Munro, The Insurer’s Reservation of Rights Letter and the Duty 
to Defend. Tr Trends 23, 25 (2001). The reservation of rights is a formal 
mechanism for an insurer to defend the insured, while asserting that a claim may 
59                   MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE                   Vol. 79 
 
However, there are many relevant, material facts that the Court 
would need to overlook for the Freyer framework to be proper. First, 
like Tidyman, where the insurer did not provide a defense, NYM 
ambiguously denied admitting “coverage for liability” in its 
reservation of rights.45 Instead of “adequately and fairly inform[ing] 
the insured of the nature of the coverage dispute and the insurer’s 
position,”46 NYM cast a wide net across any liabilities above 
$250,000, which could leave JCCS responsible for a potential 
verdict upwards of $10 million. Second, unlike Freyer, where the 
insurer provided defense and filed a declaratory action, NYM could 
have “circumvent[ed] the clear requirement,”47 and instead ignored 
Montana precedent and a “maxim of insurance law”48 by filing a 
declaratory action to discern the scope of coverage in addition to 
defending under a reservation of rights. Finally, NYM’s unclear 
defense strategy implicitly encouraged JCCS to protect themselves 
by settling directly with the Peters and assigning all judgment 
against NYM.  
 
 Since NYM’s actions were equivalent to a breach, Montana 
law does not procedurally require a court to determine the settlement 
agreement was reasonable. Instead, the settlement is presumed in 
favor of JCCS to be reasonable, and no an analysis of collusion is 
required. Looking at the material facts here, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the objective merits surrounding JCCS’s potential 
excess liability under NYM’s bare bones defense made it far more 
valuable for JCCS to confess judgment in exchange for a covenant 
not to execute. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Based on the above analysis, the Court will likely find that 
Tidyman was the correct legal framework for deciding this case. 
JCCS reasonably settled with the Peters because NYM abandoned 
JCCS in its defense. The district court’s ruling should be affirmed.  
                                                 
fall outside of coverage because it is not covered by the original policy or 
subject to exclusions.  
45 Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 1, at 44. 
46 Munro, supra note 42 (citing Clinton E. Miller, How Insurance 
Companies Settle Cases, § 363 (2000)). 
47 Tidyman’s I, 330 P.3d 1139, 1151. 
48 Munro, When the Undefended Montana Insured Settles and Assigns 
Rights in Return for a Covenant Not to Execute, Tr. Trends 21, 22–23 (2012) 
(citing Nielsen v. TIG Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976 (2006)). 
